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Existing research highlights the roles of group identities and concerns about mass migration 
in explaining attitudes towards the European Union (EU). However, studies have been largely 
VLOHQWRQZKHWKHU(8DWWLWXGHVDUHDOVRVKDSHGE\SHRSOH¶VDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVWKHSULQFLSOHV
and practices of supranational governance. This research provides a first test of the nature and 
role of supranational attitudes. We introduce a new measure of supranationalism and, in two 
studies using samples drawn from the British population, test the psychometric properties of 
the supranationalism scale. We then identify the socio-ideological correlates (right-wing 
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation) of supranationalism, along with its effects 
in predicting EU attitudes and post-Brexit preferences. Our core finding is that 
supranationalism predicts attitudes towards the EU over and above established factors such as 
national identity and immigrant threat. Our study thus shows the existence of supranational 
DWWLWXGHVDPRQJLQGLYLGXDOVDQGWKHUHOHYDQFHRIVXFKDWWLWXGHVWRSHRSOH¶VRSLQLRQVDERXW
international organisations like the EU.  
Key Words: supranationalism; Brexit; Euroscepticism; authoritarianism; social dominance; 
European integration
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³«and if we vote leave and take back control, I believe that his Thursday can be our 
FRXQWU\
VLQGHSHQGHQFHGD\´ (Boris Johnson, Member of Parliament for the Conservative 
Party) 
In his final public call to vote Leave in the Brexit referendum, Boris Johnson, a 
prominent Brexit campaigner, stated that a vote to leave would be a vote for democracy. He 
further emphasised the importance of British identity, control over British borders, economic 
prosperity, and national sovereignty. A few days later 52% of UK citizens voted to leave the 
European Union (EU).  
Empirical research has identified that national identity and attitudes towards 
immigrants play key roles in explaining YRWHUV¶RSSRVLWLRQWR(8PHPEHUVKLS in the UK and 
across Europe (e.g. Clarke, Goodwin, & Whiteley, 2017; Hobolt & de Vries, 2016, McLaren, 
2007; see also Cram, Moore, Olivieri, & Suessenbach, 2018). Yet little work has been done 
on examining how far attitudes towards the EU are shaped by more general concerns about 
supranational governance. Our aim is to investigate supranationalism at the individual level, 
to examine its core ideological underpinnings and to identify its effects on FLWL]HQ¶V opinions 
towards the EU and Brexit.  
As an attitude, supranationalism can be defined as a broad orientation towards an 
arrangement in which several state governments transfer authority over certain policy 
domains to a centralised institution, which possesses jurisdiction over those domains for all 
states involved (Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 1998). The typical aim of supranational 
institutions is to generate collective benefits on issues that cannot solely be managed at the 
national level (Simon & Valasek, 2017, Tallberg, 2002).  
Opposition to supranationalism has recently been a clarion call among a number of 
(mainly right-wing) parties across Europe, such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP), the 
Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, and the National Front in France (de Vries & Edwards, 
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2009). These parties do not reject WKH(8PHUHO\EHFDXVHRIWKDWLQVWLWXWLRQ¶VSDUWLFXODU
features or performance, but also because it represents a form of supranational government 
(Hutter, Braun, & Kerscher, 2016, Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002)$ODUJHSDUWRIWKHVHSDUWLHV¶
GLVFRPIRUWZLWKWKH(8VWHPVIURPWKHLQVWLWXWLRQ¶Vaim of an ever-closer union between 
nation-states (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). The recent electoral success of these parties, 
alongside the concerns of many commentators and citizens over globalisation and supra-
national institutions, suggests that greater attention should be paid to the nature and effects of 
supranationalism.  
The Nature of Supranationalism 
As an attitude or orientation at the individual level, supranationalism is argued to 
comprise four key elements (Nugent, 2006; Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 1998; Tallberg, 2002): 
a) a willingness to participate in supranational projects; b) a belief in the proposed problem-
solving capacity of supranational governance; c) a commitment to binding international rules 
outside of national control; d) a desire to see supranational institutions play a greater role in 
global governance.  
The aspect of participation refers to the extent to which individuals generally support 
the idea of engaging in and committing to supranational institutions and projects. Belief in 
the proposed problem-solving capacity of supranational governance denotes whether or not 
citizens believe that a centralised institution can address and solve transnational or global 
issues more effectively than individual states, which is the primary purpose of such a 
commitment (Tallberg, 2002). The aspect of commitment to binding rules refers to a 
normative acceptance of the right of supranational organizations to institute collectively 
binding rules (Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 1998). The last aspect, desire for a supranational 
role reflects the extent to which individuals think that supranational institutions should play a 
larger role in global politics.  
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Importantly, the concept of supranationalism does not merely reflect the opposite pole 
of supportive attitudes towards national governance, nor can it be inferred from reversing 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VLGHQWLILFDWLRQZLWKWKHQDWLRQDOLQJURXS6XSUDQDWLRQDOLVPFDSWXUHVDWWLWXGHV
towards aspects of transnational cooperation and organisation that are unique to this level of 
governance and go beyond attitudes towards the nation state. Despite the extensive 
discussions on supranationalism in recent political debates and theorising, to date no 
published research has LQYHVWLJDWHGSHRSOH¶VDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVWKHIXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOHV
underpinning supranational governance. A scale measuring supranationalism is thus lacking. 
The only attempt that we are aware of comes from Coromina and Saris (2012), who explored 
supranationalism by asking respondents about their preferences for either national or 
European jurisdiction over specific policy domains. Although valuable, this approach is not 
only limited by an exclusively European conceptualisation of supranationalism, it also 
conflates attitudes towards supranational governance with preferences over policy 
competences. The aim of the present research is therefore to introduce a new scale measuring 
attitudes to supranationalism, capable of allowing us to explore what role supranationalism 
plays in predicting attitudes towards the EU.  
The Ideological Underpinnings of Supranationalism 
We are also concerned to identify the core roots of attitudes towards supranational 
governance. In particular, we anticipate that supranational attitudes will be underpinned by 
WZRDVSHFWVRILQGLYLGXDOV¶LGHRORJLFDOSUHGLVSRVLWLRQV7KHVHFRQFHUQa social-cultural 
dimension, often indicated by right-wing authoritarianism (RWA, Altemeyer, 1981; 1998), 
and an economic-hierarchical dimension, typically indicated by social dominance orientation 
(SDO, Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). RWA expresses 
underlying motivations of maintaining order and social cohesion and is rooted in the belief 
that the world is a dangerous place (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Van Hiel, Cornelis, & Roets, 
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2007). It is manifested in preferences for traditional values and submission to local authority 
structures that can preserve cultural norms (Altemeyer, 1981; 1998). SDO reflects 
preferences for group-based dominance and hierarchical intergroup relations, driven by 
competitive power motivations and desires for the superiority of one group over others 
(Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). It has a strong negative association with 
support for international harmony and predicts, for instance, support for war (e.g. Heaven, 
Organ, Supavadeeprasit, & Leeson, 2006).  
Both predispositions and their underlying motivations stand in contrast to principles 
of supranational governance. Supranational governance involves the transfer of power from 
the national to the supranational level, leading to increased dependence on foreign political 
partners and increased social and cultural exchange. Given that they rely on local ingroup 
authority structures to provide order and security, people high in RWA should hold negative 
attitudes towards international institutions that reduce national control over decisions and 
resources (see also Tillman, 2013). Furthermore, increasing supranational integration to 
accommodate increased rates of transnational exchange requires a willingness to cooperate 
with other national and international actors as well as high levels of openness to change. 
However, right-wing authoritarians are more resistant to change and perceive greater external 
threats, such as threats coming from governments of other countries and outgroups (Duckitt 
& Sibley 2010; Onraet, Dhont, & Van Hiel, 2014; Van Assche, Asbrock, Dhont, & Roets, 
2018; see also Capelos & Katsanidou, 2018).  
Supranational governance also emphasizes transnational collaboration at a single 
(supranational) level, bypassing national discrepancies regarding legal procedures and socio-
economic status. This requires members to acknowledge regulations under the jurisdiction of 
an external institution, under which all members gain equal status. This collaborative focus 
reflects a perspective on European supranationalism, where supranational regulatory 
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capacities are used to redistribute human and social capital and promote solidarity among 
members (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). This goal goes against the competitive motivations 
among people high on SDO to maintain status hierarchy and inequality between groups and 
nations (Ho et al., 2012; Pratto et al., 1994).  
Supranational integration used to be promoted and championed in the UK on the basis 
of economic conservative values, which pursued a competitive neoliberal project in which 
supranational institutions were seen as aids in abolishing barriers to trade and promoting 
economic competition between countries (Pinder & Usherwood, 2013). Economic 
conservatism reflects preferences for a limited role for government in regulating free market 
economic processes, and is strongly correlated with SDO, with both being indicators of the 
economic-hierarchical ideology dimension (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 
2002). Hence, we would expect SDO and economic conservatism to have similar relations 
with supranationalism. Yet, whereas SDO focuses on group-based competition and 
intergroup hierarchies, economic conservatism emphasizes a preference for free market 
competition and the rejection of policies designed to alleviate socio-economic inequality, 
such as redistributive or affirmative action policies. Though these ideological constructs 
capture attitudes towards the same general issue of status differences between people and 
groups, SDO focuses primarily on intergroup relations and differences, while economic 
conservatism focuses more on individualV¶HFRQRPLFIUHHGRPVTherefore, their association 
with supranationalism might not completely overlap. 
Alongside RWA, SDO and economic conservatism, we anticipate attitudes to 
VXSUDQDWLRQDOLVPEHLQJVKDSHGE\SHRSOH¶VVHQVHRIQDWLRQDOLGHQWLW\0RUHVSHFLILFDOO\
citizens who hold strong and exclusive national identities are more likely to reject 
supranationalism and such supranational institutions as the EU, because they view the 
exchange of people and resources across national borders as threatening their national, 
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cultural and economic interests (Golec de Zavala, Guerra, & Simao, 2017; Hobolt & De 
Vries, 2016; McLaren, 2007). Yet it is worth noting that some citizens are able to embrace 
national and European identities, suggesting that inclusive national identities may not always 
be associated with hostility to supranational principles and institutions (Hooghe & Marks, 
2005). Finally, when it comes to assessing the effects of supranational views, we must also 
WDNHLQWRDFFRXQWWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKSHRSOH¶VDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVVXFKVXSUDQDWLRQDO
institutions as the EU are affected by the perceived threats arising from mass immigration 
(e.g., Golec de Zavala et al., 2017; Meleady, Seger, & Vermue, 2017; Swami, Barron, Weis, 
& Furnham, 2018).  
The Present Research 
The tasks undertaken in the current research are threefold. First, we design a new 
measure of supranationalism and test its psychometric qualities. Second, we investigate the 
predictors of supranationalism, specifically focusing on the role of RWA and SDO, while 
simultaneously controlling for national identification (Studies 1 and 2) and economic 
conservatism (Study 2). Third, we examine the role of supranationalism in shaping SHRSOH¶V
attitudes towards the EU and the Brexit negotiations. More specifically, we test whether 
opposition to supranationalism explains the relations between ideological attitudes (RWA and 
SDO) and opposition to the EU, or whether this relation is instead primarily shaped by 
SHRSOH¶VQDWLRQDOLGHQWLW\DQGQHJDWLYHSHUFHSWLRQVRILPPLJUDWLRQ.  
We study these issues among a sample of British citizens. This case was selected not 
because the attitudes of British citizens necessarily generalize to citizens in other countries; 
British citizens have long manifested a weaker sense of European identity than their 
counterparts in other EU countries (Ormston, 2015), and± as shown in successive 
Eurobarometer surveys ± more critical attitudes towards the EU. The relevance of the British 
case lies in the fact that supranational principles and practices have ± as a result of the Brexit 
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debate ± formed part of the national political discourse (reflected in the former Foreign 
6HFUHWDU\¶VUHPDUNVTXRWHGDWWKHKHDGRIWKLVDUWLFOH. This context facilitates the testing of 
supranational attitudes and their effects. Whether any such effects are detectable in other 
countries must await further research. But the BULWLVKFDVHLVµFULWLFDO¶LQWKDWLIQRVLJQLILFDQW
effects of supranationalism are identified here, it is doubtful whether they would be recorded 
in other west European countries. 
Study 1 
Methods  
Participants. The sample for this study was collected in December 2016, six months after the 
Brexit vote, and consisted of 336 British adults who were recruited via the online platform 
Prolific Academic (69% females; Mage = 37.50, SDage = 12.00).  
Measures. Participants completed measures of RWA, SDO, national identification, 
supranationalism, immigrant threat, and attitudes towards the EU. All measures were scored 
on a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly Agree, 7 = Strongly Disagree), unless specified otherwise.  
Supranationalism. We developed a new scale consisting of eight items to measure 
supranationalism. Participants were first presented with a brief text that explained the concept 
of supranational governance and the different forms this can take (e.g. trade agreements, or 
political and military unions). We also provided participants with a few well-known 
examples of supranational institutions (e.g. the UN, WTO) to help them understand what type 
of organisations were typical of supranational governance. We then presented participants 
with a pair of statements ± one positively worded and one negatively worded ± to test 
attitudes towards particular aspects of supranationalism that we considered central to the 
concept (see Table 1). The statements tapped the aspects of participation (e.g. µ%HLQJSDUWRI
a supranationaOLQVWLWXWLRQOLNHWKH81LVDJRRGWKLQJIRUDQDWLRQ¶problem-solving 
capacity (e.g. µ6XSUDQDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQVDUHPRUHOLNHO\WRVROYHJOREDOLVVXHVWKDQQDWLRQDOO\
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HOHFWHGJRYHUQPHQWV¶adherence to binding rules (e.g. µ:HDFKLHYHPRUHDWWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO
level iIDOOVWDWHVIROORZJOREDOUXOHVUDWKHUWKDQGRZKDWHYHUHDFKOLNHV¶DQGsupranational 
desire (e.g. µ6XSUDQDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQVVKRXOGEHJUDQWHGPRUHSRZHUVLQWKHIXWXUHVRWKDW
they can have a greater impacWRQJOREDOLVVXHV¶ 
After recoding the negatively worded items, we investigated the psychometric 
qualities of the scale. All items were positively inter-correlated with an average inter-item 
correlation of r = .47 (ranging from r =.26 to r = .65, all ps < .001; see Appendix A for full 
results of inter-item correlations). The scale yielded a CronbaFK¶VDOSKDof .88, demonstrating 
that the scale has high internal consistency.  
Next, we entered the eight items in a factor analysis using maximum likelihood 
analysis with oblique rotation. The analysis showed two highly correlated factors (r = .62) 
(see Appendix B for full results of factor analyses) explaining a total of 57% of the variance. 
The content of the items did not differ between the two dimensions. Rather, the first factor 
included all positively worded items, whereas the second factor included the recoded (i.e. 
negatively worded) items. The high correlation between the two factors, and the fact that the 
two factors differed only because of the direction of the items and not their content, support 
the idea that attitudes towards supranational governance are distributed on a single dimension 
(Hooghe & Marks, 2001). Thus, we averaged all items into a single score of 
supranationalism, with higher scores indicating more positive attitudes towards supranational 
governance. The strong psychometric properties of the new scale confirmed the successful 
development of a reliable supranationalism scale, meeting our first research aim. 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism. RWA was measured using a shortened 9-item version 
of the scale by Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, and Heled (2010, based on Altemeyer, 1981; see 
also Dhont, Hodson, & Leite, 2016). 6DPSOHLWHPVDUHµ2XUFRXQWU\ZLOOEHJUHDWLIZHVKRZ
UHVSHFWIRUDXWKRULW\DQGREH\RXUOHDGHUV¶DQGµ2EHGLHQFHDQGUHVSHFWIRUDXWKRULW\DUHWKH
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PRVWLPSRUWDQWYLUWXHVFKLOGUHQVKRXOGOHDUQ¶Negatively worded items were recoded and all 
items were averaged, with higher scores reflecting stronger RWA. The scale reliability was 
good Į= .88). 
Social Dominance Orientation. We measured SDO using the short SDO7-scale by Ho 
HWDO6DPSOHLWHPVDUHµ,W
V2.LIVRPHJURXSVKDYHPRUHRIDFKDQFHLQOLIHWKDQ
RWKHUV¶DQGµ*URXSHTXDOLW\VKRXOGQRWEHRXUSULPDU\JRDO¶Negatively worded items were 
recoded and all items were averaged, with higher scores reflecting stronger SDO. The scale 
showed a good internal reliability Į . 
National identification. Levels of national identification were measured with 5 items 
(based on Leach et al., 2008), including VWDWHPHQWVVXFKDVµ7KHIDFWWKDW,DP%ULWLVKLVDQ 
LPSRUWDQWSDUWRIP\LGHQWLW\¶DQGµ,DPJODGWREH%ULWLVK¶,WHPVFRUHVZHUHDYHUDJHGZLWK
higher scores indicating higher levels of national identification (Į .96).  
EU attitudes. Attitudes to the EU were measured through responses to a single-item 
measure of how respondents µIHHOJHQHUDOO\WRZDUGVWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶ Very Negative, 
7 = Very Positive).  
Immigrant Threat. Perceived immigrant threat was measured by two items (based on 
Stephan & Renfro, 2002) tapping challenges to the economy and society: µ,PPLJUDQWVDUH
posing a threat to the economic and political system of the United Kingdom¶DQGµ7KH
presence of immigrants is problematic for our cultural norms and values in the United 
Kingdom¶. Item scores were averaged with higher scores indicating higher levels of perceive 
immigrant threat (Į 89).1    
 
 
                                                          
1
 To verify the conceptual distinction between supranationalism, national identification, and perceived 
immigrant threat, we entered the items of these scales into a factor analysis with oblique rotation. Results 
confirmed that the items loaded onto three separate factors, representing the three expected constructs, with no 
cross-loadings higher than .25 (Online appendix I). 
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Results and Discussion 
Correlations 
Means and standard deviations for all measures are presented in Table 2, along with 
zero-order correlations. As expected, supranationalism was significantly negatively correlated 
with RWA, SDO, and national identification. Supranationalism was also positively correlated 
with EU attitudes, whereas all other variables were negatively associated with EU attitudes.   
Model Test 
To investigate the associations between the variables, we conducted structural 
equation modelling (SEM) with observed variables in Mplus (version 7.2, Muthén & Muthén, 
1998-2014). We focused in particular on the associations between RWA and SDO and 
attitudes towards the EU, and whether supranationalism would account for these associations, 
over and above perceptions of immigrant threat. To ensure that results are robust, we also 
control for various factors shown in previous studies to predict attitudes towards the EU. 
Primary here are national identification and potential economic gains and losses, with higher-
status individuals often argued to favour EU integration for reasons of economic gain (Abts, 
Heerwegh, & Swyngedouw, 2009; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; 2007). We control for individual 
socio-economic status by including education as a covariate in the model and further checked 
whether the results hold after controlling for income levels. Age and gender are also included, 
to ensure these factors do not confound any identified relationships.  All predictors were 
allowed to co-vary, as were the residual terms of immigrant threat and supranationalism.2 The 
results of this model are presented in Figure 1, which shows significant standardized 
estimates only (full model results are presented in Tables 3 and 4).  
The model shows, first, that supranationalism is negatively shaped by RWA, but not 
by SDO or national identification (Table 3). Furthermore, positive attitudes towards 
                                                          
2
 The model was fully saturated (df = 0) 
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supranational governance significantly predicted positive attitudes towards the EU, even 
when all the other factors are included in the model (Table 4). 
Estimating the indirect associations of RWA with EU attitudes revealed that RWA 
was significantly indirectly associated with less positive EU attitudes through lower levels of 
supranationalism (standardized estimate = -.09, CI95 [-.145, -.040], p = .001), in addition to 
the indirect effect through immigrant threat (standardized estimate = -.11, CI95 [-.169, -.052], 
p < .001) (see Appendix C for full results of indirect associations).  
Overall, the results of Study 1 demonstrated that the supranationalism scale proved to 
have good psychometric properties. As hypothesised, both RWA and SDO were negatively 
related to supranationalism, although when both predictors were simultaneously entered into 
the model, only RWA remained a significant predictor of supranational attitudes. Finally, the 
results demonstrated that besides concerns about mass migration, principled opposition to 
supranational governance plays a critical role in anti-EU sentiment and helps to explain why 
right-wing authoritarians show stronger anti-EU sentiments.  
Study 2 
The first aim of Study 2 was to further increase confidence in the reliability and 
validity of the supranationalism scale by establishing its psychometric quality and predictive 
power in a second sample. Furthermore, instead of relying on a single-item measure of EU 
attitudes as in Study 1, we included a multi-item measure, increasing the content validity of 
the measured construct. Importantly, the use of a multi-item measure of EU attitudes also 
allowed us to test the concept distinctiveness between EU attitudes and supranationalism. 
The second aim of this study was to examine the relations between supranationalism 
and EU attitudes, on the one hand, and RWA and SDO, on the other. Our approach was 
similar to that in Study 1, except in this study we also included a measure of economic 
conservatism to test whether the associations between ideological dispositions and 
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supranationalism and EU attitudes are driven by economic conservatism. More specifically, 
despite the conceptual overlap between SDO and economic conservatism in their acceptance 
of unequal group status, we wanted to explore whether attitudes to supranational governance 
are shaped more by concerns over financial autonomy (i.e. better captured by economic 
conservatism) or by views on group-based inequality (i.e. better captured by SDO). 
Furthermore, some scholars have suggested that economic ideological preferences may show 
a curvilinear relationship with Euroscepticism, such that those on both extremes of the 
economic ideological spectrum hold stronger Eurosceptic attitudes than moderates (Kleider & 
Stoeckel, 2018). Theoretically, those on the economic radical left might reject the EU due to 
WKH(8¶VQHROiberal capitalist character, whereas those on the economic right might perceive 
the EU as a form of µVRFLDOFDSLWDOLVP¶LQZKLFKIUHHPDUNHWVDUHXQGXO\FRQWUROOHGE\WKH
EU through a variety of economic and social regulations.  
The third aim of Study 2 was to extend our understanding of the effects of 
supranational attitudes, by examining what objectives people believe the British government 
should prioritise in the Brexit negotiations. We designed survey items that tap into these 
objectives, drawing on the priorities for the negotiations identified by the British Secretary of 
State for Exiting the European Union (Brown & Waitzman, 2016). These priorities included 
regaining national jurisdiction over domains such as border control and laws, and continued 
cooperation with the other EU members on issues such as safety and trade.  
We expected that supranationalism would predict more positive attitudes towards 
cooperative goals and more negative attitudes towards control-related goals. Furthermore, we 
hypothesised that these post-Brexit preferences would also be related to SHRSOH¶VRWA and 
SDO orientations. In particular, we theorised that RWA would be of particular relevance in 
predicting preferences towards regaining national jurisdiction, while SDO was expected to 
show a stronger association with preferences towards inter-state cooperation. 




Participants. The sample for this study was collected in November 2017, four months into 
the first round of Brexit negotiations between the UK and the EU, and one and a half years 
after the EU referendum. The sample consisted of 400 British adults who were recruited via 
the online platform Prolific Academic (73% females; Mage = 38.59, SDage = 11.58) 
Measures. Participants completed the same measures of RWA (Į .85), SDO (Į .87), and 
immigrant threat (Į = .94) as in Study 1. All measures were scored on a 7-point scale (1 = 
Strongly Agree, 7 = Strongly Disagree), unless specified otherwise. 
National Identification. We used the same measure of national identification as in 
Study 1 (Leach et al., 2008), but FKDQJHGWKHSKUDVLQJIURPµ%ULWLVK¶WRµ(QJOLVK¶%\
measuring a narrower form of national identification, we attempted to test for a stronger 
association between national identification and EU attitudes7KH&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDLQWKLV
study was .94. 
Supranationalism. We used the new supranationalism scale but extended the 
description of the definition of supranationalism.3 The satisfactory psychometric quality of 
the scale was also confirmed in this study. More specifically, the items were highly 
intercorrelated with an average inter-item correlation of r = .49 (ranging from r =.26 to r = 
.66, p < .001, see Table 1), and a &URQEDFK¶VDOSKDof .88. Again, factor analysis using 
maximum likelihood analysis with oblique rotation revealed two strongly correlated factors (r 
= .63) that distinguished between the positively and negatively worded items (see online 
Appendix B). Hence, the items were averaged into a single measure of supranationalism. 
EU attitudes. Rather than relying on a single item measure of attitudes towards the 
EU as in Study 1, we used 12 items (Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas, & de Vreese, 2011) 
                                                          
3
 In Study 2, we provided a more detailed description of supranationalism than in Study 1, explaining some of 
its core features along with an extended list of example institutions (online Appendix E). 
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tapping different aspects of the EU including identity HJµ7KH(XURSHDQ8QLRQSRVHVD
WKUHDWWR%ULWLVKLGHQWLW\DQGFXOWXUH¶; µ7KHIDFWWKDW,DPD(XURSHDQFLWL]HQLVDQLPSRUWDQW
SDUWRIP\LGHQWLW\¶ and performance HJµ7KH(XURSHDQ8QLRQLVZDVWLQJDORWRIWD[
PRQH\¶; µ7KH(XURSHDQ8QLRQIRVWHUVWKHSUHVHUYDWLRQRIWKHHQYLURQPHQW¶. After recoding 
negatively worded items, item scores were averaged with higher scores indicating more 
positive EU attitudes. Factor analysis indicated a unidimensional scale, with an excellent 
internal reliability (Į .96).  
Economic conservatism. We used 5 items to measure economic conservatism (De 
:LWWH([DPSOHLWHPVDUHµ7KHZHDOWK\KDYHDQXQIDLUDGYDQWDJHLQRXUVRFLHW\¶
(reverse codedDQGµ7KHJRYHUQPHQWVKRXOGWDNHDFWLRQVWRGHFUHDVHLQFRPHGLIIHUHQFHV¶
(reverse coded). After recoding negatively worded items, item scores were averaged with 
higher scores indicating more conservative economic attitudes (Į .83). 
Post-Brexit Preferences. We used 5 items to measure post-Brexit preferences by 
asking participants how important they thought it was to achieve the following issues during 
the Brexit negotiations: µ%ULQJLQJEDFNFRQWroORIRXUODZVWR3DUOLDPHQW¶µ%ULQJLQJEDFN
FRQWURORIGHFLVLRQVRYHULPPLJUDWLRQWRWKH8.¶ µ0aintaining the strong security 
FRRSHUDWLRQZHKDYHZLWKWKH(8¶µ(VWDEOLVKLQJWKHIUHHVWSRVVLEOHPDUNHWLQJRRGVDQG
VHUYLFHVZLWKWKH(8DQGWKHUHVWRIWKHZRUOG¶DQGµ6HFXULQJULJKWVof UK citizens living 
abroad in the EU, and EU FLWL]HQVOLYLQJLQWKH8.¶ Participants had to rate the importance 
of each goal on a 5-point scale (1 = Not important at all; 5 = Extremely important). Factor 
analysis revealed two distinct factors which distinguished the issues of µSULRULWLVLQJcontrol¶
in terms of laws and immigration DQGµSULRULWLVLQJFRRSHUDWLRQ¶LQWHUPVRI security, trade and 
citizen rights. We averaged WKHVHLWHPVLQWRPHDVXUHVRIµSULRULWLVLQJFRQWURO¶Į= .89) and 
µSULRULWLVLQJFRRSHUDWLRQ¶Į  .77). 
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Results and Discussion 
Correlations 
Means and standard deviations for all measures are presented in Table 5, along with 
zero-order correlations. As expected, supranationalism was negatively correlated with RWA, 
SDO, national identification, and economic conservatism. Furthermore, supranationalism was 
positively related to EU attitudes and prioritising cooperation, whereas negative relations 
were found with prioritising control.  
Construct distinctiveness 
Despite the marked theoretical differences between the concepts of supranationalism 
and EU attitudes, the high correlation between the variables, may suggest concept overlap. 
Yet, the use of a multi-item measure of EU attitudes in Study 2 enabled us to statistically test 
whether the scales of supranationalism and EU attitudes measure distinct constructs.  More 
specifically, entering all items of the two scales into factor analysis with oblique rotation 
revealed that the items of both scales clearly load on two separate factors. All the items on the 
EU attitude scale loaded highly onto one factor (individual item loadings ranging from .58 to 
.91), while all supranationalism items loaded highly onto a separate factor (loadings ranging 
from .40 to .84). Furthermore, the items in both scales showed non-existent or only weak 
cross-loadings (all cross-loadings <.25). Hence, we argue that the two scales measure 
distinctive constructs of supranationalism and EU support (see online Appendix F). 4 
Model Test 
We tested the same associations as in Study 1, but also included the two Brexit 
preference measures as additional criterion variables. The residual terms of all criterion 
                                                          
4
 Additional analyses showed that the correlations between supranationalism and EU attitudes are comparable in 
size to those between supranationalism and attitudes towards other supranational projects, such as the United 
Nations and the Paris Climate Agreement (online Appendix G). Attitudes towards supranationalism are thus 
related to opinions towards a range of other supranational projects, and not only to opinions towards the EU.  
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variables were allowed to covary.5 With regard to the predictors of supranationalism, the 
results showed that higher levels of RWA and SDO significantly predicted lower 
supranationalism scores (Figure 2, Table 4), whereas economic conservatism and national 
identification did not significantly predict supranationalism.6  
The model also showed that supranationalism positively predicted EU attitudes and 
prioritising cooperation after Brexit, and negatively predicted prioritising control after Brexit. 
Critically, these effects of supranationalism remained over and above the variance explained 
by all other factors in the model (Table 6).  
Estimating the indirect associations of RWA and SDO with EU attitudes further 
revealed, in line with our hypotheses, that both predictor variables were significantly 
indirectly related to EU attitudes via supranationalism, over and above the indirect 
associations through immigrant threat (Table 4)  
Similar patterns of indirect associations were observed for Brexit priority preferences 
(Table 6). Both RWA and SDO were indirectly positively associated with Brexit preferences 
of control, and indirectly negatively associated with cooperation priorities, via 
supranationalism. In line with our expectations, RWA was also directly positively related to 
prioritising regaining national control (but not to prioritising cooperation), while SDO was 
directly negatively related to prioritising the continuation of cooperation with the EU (but not 
to prioritising national control).  
In both studies, we found a negative relationship between SDO and supranationalism. 
Yet, when tested simultaneously with RWA, SDO only predicted supranationalism and EU 
attitudes in Study 2. Additional analyses for Study 2 showed that the difference between the 
studies was not due to the inclusions of additional controls (e.g. economic conservatism) in 
                                                          
5
 The model was fully saturated (df = 0) 
6
 We found no evidence for a curvilinear relationship between economic conservatism and either attitudes to the 
EU or attitudes to supranationalism. 
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Study 2 given that the effect of SDO did not change with or without these controls (online 
Appendix H). A possible explanation for this difference could be the shift in public and 
media discourse between data collection of Study 1 and 2. Study 1 was conducted six months 
after the referendum, but before the UK Supreme Court had decided whether the UK 
parliament must formally approve the triggering of Article 50.7 Study 2 was conducted 16 
months after the referendum, at a point when the UK was four months into Brexit 
negotiations and the competing interests between the UK and the EU were highly salient. It is 
possible that the different contexts in which the data for the two studies were gathered meant 
that the competitive motivations underlying SDO (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Van Hiel et al., 
2007) were triggered more in Study 2 than in Study 1.  
Overall, Study 2 largely replicated the results of Study 1 and established that our 
supranationalism scale is a reliable and valid measure of attitudes towards supranational 
governance, and not just towards a particular embodiment of supranationalism, such as the 
EU. :HIRXQGSHRSOH¶Vsocio-ideological orientations to be predictors of supranationalism, 
notably RWA (Studies 1 and 2) and also SDO (Study 2). Once these variables are included in 
the models, economic conservatism and national identification did not provide any additional 
value in predicting supranationalism. Furthermore, the findings indicated that concerns over 
national control are predominantly associated with authoritarian predispositions, whereas 
concerns over international cooperation are more strongly related to dominance strivings and 
desires for social hierarchies.  
General Discussion 
The current research investigated, for the first time, supranationalism as a distinctive 
orientation among individuals, its ideological correlates, and its role in predicting 
Euroscepticism. We demonstrated that supranationalism can be reliably measured with a 
                                                          
7
 Article 50 is the part of the Lisbon Treaty that provides for any member state to leave the EU. 
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newly developed scale, which consistently predicted attitudes towards the EU, even while 
controlling for a range of variables (ideological, intergroup, and identity-based) found in 
previous studies (e.g., Golec de Zavala et al., 2017; Hobolt & de Vries, 2016) to shape 
SHRSOH¶VRULHQWDWLRQVWRWKH(8. This finding supports the hypothesis that Euroscepticism is 
not only shaped by instrumental and affective factors, such as attitudes towards immigration 
and feelings of national identity, but is also shaped E\SHRSOH¶VYLHZVWRZDUGVthe general 
principles of supranational governance. This finding is in line with recent analysis by Clarke 
et al. (2017), which shows that popular support for Brexit was substantially driven by 
FRQFHUQVDERXW%ULWDLQ¶VVRYHUHLJQW\ under EU membership, quite apart from concerns about 
immigration. In sum, our findings inform public debate and add to the growing body of 
literature on Euroscepticism by highlighting the role played by attitudes towards 
supranational principles of governance (see also Rico & Guinjoan, 2018). 
When it comes to the predictors of supranationalism, the studies showed a clear role 
for RWA. This finding supports the idea that supranational governance is intrinsically 
unattractive for authoritarians, given that a core feature of supranationalism is the transfer of 
authority and a reduction of control over local institutions and decision-making processes. 
Our findings thus align with recent work which shows that authoritarian attitudes manifest 
themselves in nationalist and anti-globalist positions (Scotto, Sanders, & Reifler, 2018). 
Furthermore, although national identification was negatively associated with 
supranationalism, it did not predict supranationalism when controlling for RWA and SDO. 
This is consistent with the idea that attitudes towards supranational governance cannot be 
inferred merely IURPDQLQGLYLGXDO¶Vnational identity.  
Our understanding about the inter-relationship between ideological and supranational 
attitudes, public discourse, and opinions over Brexit, would benefit greatly from a dynamic 
perspective using a longitudinal design. Cross-sectional designs do not allow us to draw any 
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conclusions about changes in the relations between such individual and environmental 
factors. Furthermore, while the crowdsourcing platform Prolific Academic provides high 
quality data, benefitting from a large, socio-economically diverse participant pool (Peer, 
Brandimarte, Sama, & Acquisti, 2017), the use of online crowdsourced samples limits the 
generalisability of our findings. To address this issue, future studies using more 
representative samples are needed. 
As we noted earlier, supranationalism arguably plays a more central role in public 
debates on the EU in Britain than in other west European countries. The findings presented 
here are thus suggestive, but not conclusive, for other countries, for which we would urge 
additional empirical study. After all, in many of these countries (see Curtis & Nielsen, 2018), 
there are intense public debates about the merits ± and more often the limits ± of 
supranational institutions and practices. The nature and role of supranational governance is 
WKXVDWRSLFRQZKLFKSROLF\PDNHUV¶DQGSXEOLFDWWHQWLRQLVRQO\OLNHO\WRJURZ.  
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Table 1  
Supranationalism Scale and Corrected Item-total Correlations. 
 Item-total correlation 
 Study 1 Study 2 
1. Engaging in supranational politics is generally a good thing for a nation. (Participation +) .62 .73 
2. Every nation is best off acting independently on the global stage, without commitment to supranational institutions. (Participation -) .72 .70 
3. National governments should never give up authority to supranational institutions on important global issues. (Problem-solving 
Capacity -) .73 .59 
4. Supranational institutions are more likely to solve global issues than nationally elected governments. (Problem-solving Capacity +) .65 .67 
5. We achieve more at the international level if all states follow global rules rather than do whatever each likes. (Binding Rules +) .59 .64 
6. Every nationally elected government should decide independently which rules and standards their citizens must abide by. (Binding 
Rules -) .54 .54 
7. Supranational institutions should play a bigger role on the global political stage in the future.  
(Supranational Desire +) .62 .65 
8. We should keep political power at the national level and nations should decide on global issues independently. (Supranational Desire -
) .65 .67 
 
Note. Three items were slightly rephrased in Study 2 to reflect more nuanced statements. 
,Q6WXG\LWHPUHDGµ%HLQJSDUWRIDVXSUDQDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQLVDJRRGWKLQJIRUDQDWLRQ¶,WHPµ(YHU\QDWLRQLVEHVt off acting independently without interference from 
VXSUDQDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQV¶DQG,WHPµ6XSUDQDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQVVKRXOGEHJUDQWHGPRUHSRZHUVLQWKHIXWXUHVRWKDWWKH\FDQKDYHJUHDWHULPSDFWRQJOREDOLVVXHV¶




Means, standard deviations and correlations between variables in Study 1. 
 M (SD) 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. RWA 3.57 (1.13) .47*** -.47*** .45*** .54*** -.50*** 
2. SDO 2.84 (1.16) - -.28*** .28*** .50*** -.32*** 
3. Supranationalism 4.48 (1.10)  - -.29*** -.54*** .61*** 
4. National Identification 4.87 (1.48)   - .38*** -.32*** 
5. Immigrant Threat 3.45 (1.83    - -.63*** 
6. EU Attitudes 4.57 (1.97)     - 
Note. *p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 3.  
Results (standardised estimates) of Study 1 (S1) and Study 2 (S2) for the associations of RWA 
and SDO predicting supranationalism and immigrant threat, controlling for national 
identification, economic conservatism, and demographic variables.  
  Supranationalism  Immigrant threat 
  ȕ [CI95] p ȕ [CI95] p 
RWA S1 -.35 [-.471, -.220] <.001 .29 [.156, .416] <.001 
 S2 -.27 [-.388, -.113] <.001 .30 [.344, .779] <.001 
SDO S1 -.07 [-.181, .040] .211 .32 [.196, .436] <.001 
 S2 -.21 [-.317, -.097] <.001 .19 [.152, .583] .001 
National Identification S1 -.10 [-.209, .014] .070 .14 [.032, .241] .010 
 S2 -.08 [-.174, .018] .145 .17 [.082, .417] .003 
Economic Conservatism S1 / / / / 
 S2 -.03 [-.111, .062] .580 -.12 [-.346, -.019] .026 
Age S1 -.12 [-.216, -.013] .026 .13 [.037, .214] .005 
 S2 -.03 [-.010, .004] .420 .05 [-.005, .022] .210 
Gender S1 .05 [-.049, .142] .339 -.02 [-.106, .062] .612 
 S2 .11 [.034, .491] .029 -.06 [-.655, .091] .137 
Education S1 .16 [.055, 265] .003 -.12 [-.213, -.023] .015 
 S2 .18 [.087, .294] <.001 -.24 [-.640, -.301] <.001 
Note: Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female), Education (1 = GCSE, 2 = A-Levels, 3 = BSc/Ba, 4 = MSc/Ma, 5 =PhD). 
Testing our models while controlling for personal and household income (S1, N = 217; S2, N = 292), revealed 
highly similar results (Appendix J). 
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Table 4  
Results (standardised estimates) of Study 1 (S1) and Study 2 (S2) showing the effects of 
supranationalism on EU attitudes and post-Brexit preferences, controlling for ideological, 
intergroup, identity-based, and demographic variables.  
 
  EU attitudes Brexit Cooperation Brexit Control 
  ȕ [CI95] p ȕ [CI95] p ȕ [CI95] p 
Supranationalism S1 .23 [.188, .333] <.001 / / / / 
 S2 .39 [.421, .627] <.001 .33 [.152, .374] <.001 -.24 [-.373, -.198] <.001 
RWA S1 -.23 [-.338, -.116] <.001 / / / / 
 S2 -.03 [-.165, .084] .530 .04 [-.083, .141] .598 .22 [.162, .351] <.001 
SDO S1 .05 [-.053, .152] .347 / / / / 
 S2 -.03 [-.165, .078] .477 -.13 [-.202, -.006] .042 .05 [-.038, .151] .231 
National Identification S1 .06 [-.043, .156] .264 / / / / 
 S2 .07 [-.018, .162] .118 .15 [.024, .176] .011 .13 [.058, .203] .001 
Immigrant Threat S1 -.34 [-.456, -.221] <.001 / / / / 
 S2 -.41 [-.353, -.219] <.001 -.12 [-.105, .008] .086 .39 [.193, .304] <.001 
Economic Conservatism S1 / / / / / / 
 S2 -.03 [-.134, .073] .566 -.01 [-.087, .067] .816 -.04 [-.113, .041] .371 
Age S1 -.11 [-.189, -.028] .008 / / / / 
 S2 -.17 [-.028, -.012] .037 .05 [-.003, .010] .338 .07 [.001, .014] .037 
Gender S1 .05 [-.033, .132] .237 / / / / 
 S2 .11 [.093, .554] .005 .02 [-.152, .211] .753 -.02 [-.207, .117] .590 
Education S1 .08 [.000, .162] .050 / / / / 
 S2 .01 [-.093, .111] .886 .08[-.022, .143] .155 -.03[-.114, .053] .470 
Note: Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female), Education (1 = GCSE, 2 = A-Levels, 3 = BSc/Ba, 4 = MSc/Ma, 5 = 
PhD). Testing our models while controlling for personal and household income (S1, N = 217; S2, N = 292), 
revealed highly similar results (Appendix J). 




Means, standard deviations and correlations between variables in Study 2 
 M (SD) 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. RWA 3.57 (1.13) .45*** .36*** -.45*** .45*** .50*** -.42*** .61*** -.18*** 
2. SDO 2.84 (1.16) - .55*** -.38*** .23*** .33*** -.35*** .38*** -.25*** 
3. Economic Conservatism 2.78 (1.21)  - -.26*** .21*** .14** -.19*** .21*** -.14** 
4. Supranationalism 4.48 (1.10)   - -.28*** -.51*** .64*** -.60*** .40*** 
5. National Identification 4.87 (1.48)    - .37*** -.24*** .46*** -.01 
6. Immigrant Threat 3.45 (1.83     - -.65*** .71*** -.27*** 
7. EU-Attitudes 4.57 (1.97)      - -.71*** .39*** 
8. Brexit-Control 3.46 (1.23)       - -.16** 
9. Brexit-Cooperation 3.95 (0.82)        - 
Note. *p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 




Results of Effect Decomposition Analyses (standardized estimates) for the associations of RWA and SDO with EU attitudes and post-Brexit 
preferences, controlling for national identification, economic conservatism, and demographics in Study 2 
 EU-Attitudes Brexit Control Brexit Cooperation 
 ȕ [CI95] p ȕ [CI95] p ȕ [CI95] p 
Total effect for RWA -.26 [-.386, -.130] <.001 .40 [.299, .503] <.001 -.08 [-.242, .076] .307 
Direct effect for RWA -.03 [-.127, .065] .530 .22 [.140, .298] <.001 .04 [-.104, .180] .598 
Total indirect effect for RWA -.23 [-.311, -.144] <.001 .18 [.116, .247] <.001 -.13 [-.183, -.059] <.001 
Indirect effect via Supranationalism  -.10 [-.163, -.045] .001 .06 [.027, .099] .001 -.09 [-.143, -.029] .003 
Indirect effect via Immigrant threat -.12 [-.175, -.071] <.001 .12 [.067, .171] <.001 -.04 [-.077, .007] .099 
Total effect for SDO -.19 [-.309, -.077] .001 .18 [.081, .265] <.001 -.22 [-.337, -.094] .001 
Direct effect for SDO -.03 [-.124, .078] .477 .05 [-.030, .126] .231 -.13 [-.246, -.005] .042 
Total indirect effect for SDO -.16 [-.237, -.083] <.001 .13 [.062, .187] <.001 -.09 [-.142, -.038] .001 
Indirect effect via Supranationalism -.08 [-.127, -.036] <.001 .05 [.018, .081] .002 -.07 [-.113, -.023] .004 
Indirect effect via Immigrant threat -.08 [-.129, -.026] .003 .08 [.028, .123] .002 -.02 [-.052, .008] .145 
 





Figure 1. Associations (standardised estimates) of RWA, SDO with EU-attitudes via Immigrant-threat and supranationalism, controlling for 
national identification, age and gender (see Tables 3 and 4 for full results).  
*p<.05, ** p<.01**, ***p<.001 




Figure 2. Associations (standardized estimates) of RWA, SDO with EU attitudes and Brexit-priorities via Immigrant-threat and 
supranationalism. Dashed lines depict the effects of national identification (control variable). Other control variables were economic 
conservatism, age, gender and education (see Tables 3 and 4 for full results). 
*p<.05, ** p<.01**, ***p<.001 
